The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that Mexico is not in compliance with international safety standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), following an assessment of the country’s civil aviation authority. As a result, the United States is downgrading Mexico from a Category 1 to Category 2 rating.

As part of the FAA’s International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) program, the agency assesses the civil aviation authorities of all countries with air carriers that operate or have applied to fly to the United States and makes that information available to the public. The assessments determine whether or not foreign civil aviation authorities are meeting ICAO safety standards, not FAA regulations. With the IASA Category 2 rating, Mexican air carriers cannot establish new service to the United States, although they are allowed to maintain existing service.

While Mexico has been responsive to the FAA’s findings and has made significant improvements in recent months, it was unable to fully comply with all of the international safety standards.  However, under the leadership of Director General Hector Gonzalez Weeks, Mexico continues to make progress. The FAA is committed to working closely with the Mexican government and providing technical assistance to help Mexico regain its Category 1 rating.

A Category 1 rating means the country’s civil aviation authority complies with ICAO standards.  A Category 2 rating means a country either lacks laws or regulations necessary to oversee air carriers in accordance with international standards, or that its civil aviation authority – equivalent to the FAA for aviation safety matters – is deficient in one or more areas, such as technical expertise, trained personnel, record-keeping or inspection procedures.

Countries with air carriers that fly to the United States must adhere to the safety standards of ICAO, the United Nations’ technical agency for aviation that establishes international standards and recommended practices for aircraft operations and maintenance.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration is proposing a civil penalty of $230,000 against Continental Airlines for allegedly operating a Boeing 767 on 22 revenue flights when it was not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.

The FAA alleges that on Aug. 12, 2008, Continental replaced the nose landing gear wheel and tire assembly on a B-767, but failed to install the required axle washer despite warnings in the maintenance manual and on the tire assembly itself. The warning said failing to install the washer could lead to failure of the wheel bearing.

FAA inspectors discovered the violation during a records check and noted three identical earlier violations.

Continental has 30 days from receipt of the civil penalty letter to respond to the agency.

The Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has suspended the air operator’s certificates of Skymaster Air Services and Avtex Air Services. These two charter operators, which share the same ownership, are based at Sydney’s Bankstown airport.

CASA believes allowing Skymaster Air Services and Avtex Air Services to continue to operate while CASA completes further safety investigations poses a serious and imminent risk to air safety.

There have been three serious accidents and a number of incidents involving Skymaster aircraft in the last three months. On 15 June 2010 an aircraft operated by Skymaster crashed at Canley Vale in Sydney, with the pilot and a flight nurse killed. Other accidents include a wheels-up landing and a collapsed nose gear on landing. Incidents include a loss of engine power, fuel flow problems and landing gear malfunctions.

CASA’s decision to suspend Skymaster Air Services and Avtex Air Services is also based on issues relating to the safety culture of the operations, aircraft maintenance control and pilot training.

The suspension of Skymaster and Avtex will end in five business days from Friday 23 July 2010, unless CASA applies to the Federal Court for an order to continue the suspension for up to 40 days. During that time CASA will complete its investigation and determine what further action may need to be taken.

CASA’s actions are separate from the continuing investigation into the Canley Vale accident by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the independent Commonwealth transport accident investigator.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing to assess a  civil penalties of $50,000 against Spirit Airlins for alleged violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations.

The FAA alleges that Spirit Airlines returned an aircraft to service, and then operated that aircraft on revenue passenger flights when it was not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations. The FAA alleged that Spirit failed to replace a faulty elevator aileron computer (ELAC) after the aircraft experienced an uncommanded pitch down of the nose while operating between Orlando, Fla. and San Juan, Puerto Rico on Aug. 21, 2009. Although Spirit’s maintenance program required replacement of the ELAC computer, the airline did not do so before flying the A321 on a revenue passenger flight the next day from San Juan to Fort Lauderdale, when the aircraft experienced another uncommanded pitch down.

The European Commission has updated the list of airlines banned in the European Union to include one carrier from Surinam and to expand the operating restrictions on Iran Air. In addition, two carriers from Indonesia have been removed from the list of banned airlines.

With this fourteenth update, the carrier Blue Wing Airlines from Surinam is included in the list of banned airlines following measures taken by a Member State as a consequence of a series of accidents suffered by this airline and serious deficiencies revealed during ramp inspections of its aircraft.

Based on the results of the visit to Iran, led by the Commission with the participation of experts from Member States and EASA to verify implementation by Iran Air of measures announced at the last Air Safety Committee in March 2010 by the civil aviation organisation of Iran and the air carrier, the Air Safety Committee unanimously supported the expansion of the operating restrictions imposed on Iran Air to exclude from operations into the EU its fleet of Airbus A-320 and of Boeing B-727 and B-747. The Commission will continue to closely monitor the performance of the airline through the results of ramp checks of its aircraft which can operate in the EU and will intensify its consultations with the civil aviation organisation of Iran to find sustainable solutions to the identified safety problems, where practicable through technical assistance.

With this update the Commission has also recognised the improvements in the oversight exercised by the competent authorities of Indonesia. These improvements allowed the Air Safety Committee to support the removal from the list of two Indonesian air carriers: Metro Batavia and Indonesia Air Asia.

In the same vein, the Commission welcomes the progress made by the civil aviation authority of Gabon in the implementation of the corrective action plan aimed at resolving the deficiencies identified by ICAO, and decided to allow air carrier Afrijet – which is permitted to operate under restrictions in the EU – to add another aircraft to its fleet used for such services.

In the framework of this update, the civil aviation authority of Albania is urged to intensify its oversight in relation to all carriers and continue to implement the action plan agreed with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), to give priority to those areas which raise safety concerns and to speed up its technical and administrative capacity building.

Today, the Community list has four carriers whose operations are fully banned in the European Union: Ariana Afghan Airlines from Afghanistan, Blue Wing Airlines from Surinam, Siem reap Airways International from Cambodia and Silverback Cargo Freighters from Rwanda. All carriers from 17 countries – 278 companies in total – are banned: Angola, Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon (with the exception of three carriers which operate under restrictions and conditions), Indonesia (with the exception of six carriers from which the restrictions have been fully removed), Kazakhstan (with the exception of one carrier which operates under restrictions and conditions), the Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Philippines, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Swaziland and Zambia. There are 9 air carriers allowed to operate under restrictions and conditions: Air Koryo from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, TAAG Angola Airlines, Air Astana from Kazakhstan, Iran Air from Iran, Gabon Airlines, Afrijet and SN2AG from Gabon, Air Service Comores and Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines from Ukraine.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing $2,476,075 in civil penalties against Trans States Airlines and GoJet Airlines of Bridgeton, Mo., for violation of various maintenance procedures and operating nine jets on 320 revenue passenger flights when the aircraft were not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.

Trans States Airlines and GoJet Airlines are both owned and operated by Trans States Holdings. Trans States Airlines performs maintenance and training on GoJet aircraft.

The proposed civil penalties involve seven GoJet+ Canadair Regional Jets and two Trans States Embraer 145 regional jets. The FAA alleges Trans States and GoJet operated aircraft when maintenance had been carried out incorrectly, and that the company failed to complete required maintenance record-keeping.

The FAA alleges Trans States and GoJet violated a number of maintenance regulations and procedures, including use of outdated manufacturers’ maintenance instructions to perform repairs; failure to connect a wing flap actuator to its torque tube, rendering the flaps inoperative; failure to document an inspection after an aircraft was damaged by severe turbulence; failure to document and carry out proper repairs after aircraft warning systems identified problems; improper repair of an engine oil leak and failure to comply with minimum equipment list regulations.

Trans States and GoJet have 30 days from receipt of the civil penalty letters to respond to the agency.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) published a study into factors influencing misaligned take-off occurrences at night. This report examines both Australian as well as relevant international occurrences
where pilots have misperceived their lateral position on runway due to darkness and a combination of individual influences, runway, weather and task conditions.

The study was iniated following several occurrences that involved aircraft commencing takeoff on the runway edge lighting. All five recent Australian misaligned take-off and landing occurrences involved aircraft with weights greater than 5,700kg and three of the six occurrences involved scheduled regular passenger transport operations. The remaining two occurrences involved charter operations.

After reviewing the Australian and international occurrences, eight common factors were identified that increased the risk of a misaligned take-off or landing occurrence. The factors included:

• distraction or divided attention of the flight crew;
• confusing runway layout; displaced threshold or intersection departure;
• poor visibility or weather; air traffic control clearance/s issued during runway entry;
• no runway centreline lighting;
• flight crew fatigue; and
• recessed runway edge lighting

To foster safety awareness, knowledge and action, the ATSB developed a pilot information card to help flight crew identify factors that could increase the risk of a misaligned take-off or landing.

A new report released by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) highlights ways to manage the risks posed by aircraft hitting birds and reveals that the reported number of  birdstrikes in Australia has steadily increased over the past eight years.

The report, which provides aviation birdstrike and animal strike occurrence data between January 2002 and December 2009, shows that in 2009 alone there were 1,340 birdstrikes reported to the ATSB.

The increase in the number of birdstrikes, however, is consistent with the increase in the number of high capacity aircraft movements over the period as well as a greater willingness of people in aviation to report safety occurrences to the ATSB.

Most birdstrikes occur within the confines of aerodromes (less than 5 km). Major and regional towered aerodromes had significantly higher rates of reported birdstrikes than General Aviation Airport Procedures (GAAP) aerodromes, and had considerably increasing rates from 2002 to 2009. GAAP aerodrome birdstrike rates do not appear to have changed.

Engine ingestion makes up 11 per cent of all birdstrike occurrences in high capacity air transport for the 8- year period, and the highest number of damaging birdstrikes occurs in high capacity air transport. Birdstrikes causing multiple parts damaged were not common throughout the period. General aviation had the highest proportion of damaging birdstrikes, with almost 24 per cent of birdstrikes causing damage. Aeroplane wings and helicopter rotor blades are the most commonly damaged aircraft components across all operational types, particularly in general aviation. There have been eight occurrences from the period of 2002-2009 that have resulted in serious aircraft damage, and four that have resulted in injury.

The most common types of birds struck by aircraft were lapwings/plovers, bats/flying foxes, galahs, and kites. Not surprisingly, larger birds were more likely to result in aircraft damage.

Animal strikes were relatively rare. High capacity air transport had the highest average with 11.5 animal strikes per year, with general aviation having the second highest average with 9.3 animal strikes per year. The most common animals involved in strikes were hares/rabbits, kangaroos, wallabies, and foxes/dogs. Damaging strikes mostly involved kangaroos, wallabies and livestock.

Bird hazard control at aerodromes was found to be mostly related to the control of grass height (short or long) and growing specific plants or grass, and the daily or weekly use or auditory deterrents, especially car horns and shotguns.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes to amend the airworthiness standards applicable to certain transport category airplanes certified for flight in icing conditions and the icing airworthiness standards applicable to certain aircraft engines.

The proposed regulations would improve safety by addressing supercooled large drop icing conditions for transport category airplanes most affected by these icing conditions, mixed phase and ice crystal conditions for all transport category airplanes, and supercooled large drop, mixed phase, and ice crystal icing conditions for all turbine engines. These proposed regulations are the result of information gathered from a review of icing accidents and incidents.

A de Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter sustained substantial damage in a landing gear failure in Sweden in June 2009. The Swedish accident investigators concluded that the gear fractured as the result of a fatigue crack.

The pilot intended to take off with 21 parachutists on board the aircraft. He did not notice anything abnormal, neither during the preparations for take-off nor during the initial taxiing.
After taxiing for a few minutes at low speed, suddenly the right main landing gear broke, whereupon the aircraft tipped over to the right and the right wing struck the ground. The aircraft then slowed down, turned somewhat to the right, and stopped. No person onboard was injured.
The technical examination of the aircraft has shown that the right main landing gear fractured as the result of a fatigue crack. The crack consisted of several smaller fatigue cracks that had grown and joined. The cracks had initiated in an external welded joint and developed over an extended period of time without being detected.
The aircraft type has been exposed to landing gear fracture before as the result of fatigue cracks in the actual area. Current maintenance system prescribes NDT inspection of the landing gear within intervals of 12,000 flying hours or five years, whichever comes first.

The Swedish Accident Investigation Board recommends that EASA and the Swedish Transport Agency, in conjunction with the manufacturer, consider the need for supplementing the present maintenance system in respect of crack formation in the landing gear.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) released a study of ground operations occurrences at Australian airports from 1998 to 2008. The key to preventing ground occurrences appears to revolve around ensuring effective communication between pilots, ground crews and air traffic services through a process of checks and balances.

The aviation industry has been slow to acknowledge the risks associated with ground operations. While most occurrences on airport aprons and taxiways do not have consequences in terms of loss of life, they are often associated with aircraft damage, delays to passengers and avoidable financial costs to industry.
The most common contributing factor to ground operations occurrences were individual actions. For occurrences between 1998 and 2008, these most frequently involved action errors, where a person deviated either from plans or standard operating procedures. Common examples were towbar connection procedures and pushback errors, like turning back too sharply with the tug and damaging the nose or landing gear of the aircraft. Less frequently, individual action errors were associated with a violation, information, or decision error. Violations involved a deliberate intention to deviate from standard operating procedures. Examples included opening the doors while the aircraft anti-collision beacon was operating, or vehicle drivers failing to give-way to aircraft on the apron or taxiways. Decision errors indicated that planned actions were not adequate for the situation; for example,

Indian Civil Aviation Minister Praful Patel inaugurated the newly formed Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Council (CASAC). The council will give suggestions to the Government on various air safety issues.

The first CASAC meeting was held on June 3, 2010. The 28 members will meet every month for three months and then on a quarterly basis. Aviation Minister Patel indicated : “…in future we will try to even bring about suitable legislations if necessary to further strengthen the DGCA, and empower it by appropriate legislation so that the autonomy of the DGCA is well respected.“

Meanwhile, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation has already sent 11 teams to inspect all the runways in India, which are classified as critical. The airports that will be inspected first on a priority basis are:

• Leh Airport (IXL/VILH)
• Kulu-Bhuntar Airport (KUU/VIBR)
• Shimla Airport (SLV/VISM)
• Port Blair Airport (IXZ/VOPB)
• Agartala-Singerbhil Airport (IXA/VEAT)
• Lengpui/Aizawl Airport (AJL/VEAZ)
• Kozhikode-Calicut Airport (CCJ/VOCL)
• Mangalore-Bajpe Airport (IXE/VOML)
• Jammu-Satwari Airport (IXJ/VIJU)
• Patna Airport (PAT/VEPT)
• Latur Airport (LTU)

NAV Canada, responsible for air traffic control, demands access to the cockpit voice recorder transcript of the Air France Airbus accident at Toronto in 2005. They claim to need the transcript to defend itself against a $200 million lawsuit brought by Air France.

In February 2005 an Air France Airbus A340 overran the runway on landing at Toronto-Pearson International Airport, ON (YYZ) in severe weather. The plane burst into flames, but all on board got out and no one was killed.

Air France and its insurers are suing NAV Canada, the Greater Toronto Airports Authority and the Attorney General of Canada, representing the federal environment and transportation departments, for loss of the plane and indemnity for all losses. NAV Canada alleges the pilots were negligent and needs the transcript to make its case.

The Toronto Star reports that the case is coming before the Ontario Court of Appeal. The newspaper reports that cvr transcripts are protected by Canadian federal legislation. A court, however, can order the transcripts to be disclosed to litigants when there is an overriding public interest.

File photo of an Air Canada Airbus A319 (Photo: Harro Ranter)

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) today released its final investigation report into the January 10, 2008 encounter with wake turbulence involving the Air Canada Airbus A319 operating as flight AC190.
AC190 was en route from Victoria, BC, to Toronto, ON, with 83 passengers and 5 crew members. At 06:48 local time, a series of jolts were felt in AC190, followed by a series of rolls. The crew declared an emergency and diverted the flight to Calgary International Airport, Alberta, where it landed uneventfully at 07:28. Several passengers and crew members were injured.

TSB investrigators concluded that there was enough separation between the A319 and a preceding Boeing 747-400, flight UA896. But the wake vortices from flight UA896 had not dissipated. The wingtip vortices contained sufficient energy to significantly destabilize the A319 in pitch and roll, which contributed to displacement of persons and objects in the cabin.

During recovery from the upset, pilot rudder and sidestick control inputs resulted in aircraft sideslip and g loadings. These contributed to the displacement of occupants and objects in the cabin, as well as placing lateral accelerations and aerodynamic loads on the vertical stabilizer structure to beyond certified limits.
During the 18-second duration of the event, vertical accelerations reached peak values of +1.57g and -0.77g. Lateral accelerations reached peak values of +0.49g (right) and 0.46g (left) during four oscillations. Some actions to rectify the upset were similar to those that contributed to damage to the vertical stabilizer attachment fittings on flight AA587 in 2001. The Airbus A300 in that event crashed after separation of the vertical stabilizer.

The TSB further notes that annual recurrent A319/A320 pilot training at Air Canada did not consistently include reference to the hazards of pilot rudder pedal reversals during upset recovery at high airspeeds. This increased the likelihood that pilots would make inappropriate rudder pedal inputs during upset recoveries.

The aircraft involved in this event were:

• Air Canada Flight AC190: Airbus A319-114 C-GBHZ
• United Airlines Flight UA896: Boeing 747-422 N104UA

Based on preliminary findings from the investigation of a partial gear up landing of a CRJ200 in December 2008, as well as prior investigative findings, the U.S. NTSB voiced its concerns about training for mechanics and inspectors. Two safety recommendations were issued and three older recommendations were re-iterated.

On December 14, 2008, about 17:00 local time, Air Wisconsin Airlines flight 3919, a Canadair CL-600-2B19 (CRJ-200), N407AW, landed at Philadelphia International Airport, PA (PHL), with the left main landing gear in the retracted position. The aircraft was being flown as a repositioning flight from Norfolk International Airport, VA (ORF) to PHL. There were no injuries to the two flight crew and one flight attendant on board the aircraft.

The flight crew received indications of a left main landing gear problem prior to landing and stated that they completed the applicable Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) procedures, but were unable to lower the left main landing gear. They elected to land with the nose and right main landing gear in the down and locked position and the left main landing gear up.

Maintenance had been performed on both the left and right main landing gear systems prior to the incident flight. Post-incident inspection of the aircraft revealed that, the upper attachment bolt for the left main landing gear uplock assembly, which is designed to be attached to both the uplock mechanism and the structure, was attached to the airplane structure only.

The NTSB concludes that the incident mechanic was not properly trained or supervised when he replaced the uplock assembly on the incident airplane for the first time, which led to the error in installation. Further, the error was not detected by the inspector. The NTSB is concerned that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not currently require mechanics to receive on-the-job training (OJT) or be supervised while performing required inspection item (RII) tasks for the first time.

Problems with untrained or unsupervised mechanics performing maintenance tasks for the first time have also been found during the NTSB’s investigation of the January 8, 2003,  fatal accident involving a Beechctaft 1900D  which crashed shortly after takeoff at Charlotte-Douglas International Airport, NC. The accident airplane underwent a detail six maintenance check.  One of the mechanics assigned to check the elevator control cable tension was receiving OJT under the supervision of a quality assurance inspector who failed to adequately supervise and direct the mechanic.

Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA:

Require that mechanics performing required inspection item and other critical tasks receive on-the-job training or supervision when completing the maintenance task until the mechanic demonstrates proficiency in the task. (A-10-96)

Require that required inspection item (RII) inspectors receive supervision or on-the-job training on the proper inspection of RII items until the inspector demonstrates proficiency in inspection. (A-10-97)

The National Transportation Safety Board issued two urgent safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) following four recent events in which the aircraft experienced an uncontained engine failure of its GE CF6-45/50 series engine.

The first recommendation asks that the FAA require operators of aircraft equipped with a particular model engine to immediately perform blade borescope inspections (BSI) of the high pressure turbine rotor at specific intervals until the current turbine disk can be redesigned and replaced with one that can withstand the unbalance vibration forces from the high pressure rotor. The second recommendation asks the FAA to require the engine manufacturer to immediately redesign the disk. The NTSB issued an additional recommendation for a requirement that operators perform a second type of inspection and another recommendation related to the engine manufacturer regarding the installation of the replacement disk.

All four recommendations apply to the low pressure turbine (LPT) stage 3 (S3) rotor disk in the General Electric (GE) CF6-45/50 series turbofan engines that can fail unexpectedly when excited by high-pressure (HP) rotor unbalance.
An uncontained engine event occurs when an engine failure results in fragments of rotating engine parts penetrating and exiting through the engine case. Uncontained turbine engine disk failures within an aircraft engine present a direct hazard to an airplane and its passengers because high-energy disk fragments can penetrate the cabin or fuel tanks, damage flight control surfaces, or sever flammable fluid or hydraulic lines. Engine cases are not designed to contain failed turbine disks. Instead, the risk of uncontained disk failure is mitigated by designating disks as safety-critical parts, defined as the parts of an engine whose failure is likely to present a direct hazard to the aircraft.
In its safety recommendations to the FAA, the NTSB cited four foreign accidents, which the NTSB is either investigating or participating in an investigation led by another nation, in which the aircraft experienced an uncontained engine failure of its GE CF6-45/50 series engine.

The date, location, and circumstances of these four events (none had injuries or fatalities) are as follows:

On July 4, 2008, a Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) Boeing 747-300 experienced an engine failure during initial climb after takeoff from Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This investigation has been delegated to the NTSB.

On March 26, 2009, an Arrow Cargo McDonnell Douglas DC-10F, about 30 minutes after takeoff from Manaus, Brazil, experienced loss of oil pressure in one engine. The pilots shut down the engine and diverted to Medellin, Columbia. This investigation has been delegated to the NTSB.

On December 17, 2009, a Jett8 Cargo Boeing 747-200F airplane was passing through 7,000 feet above ground level (agl) when the flight crewmembers heard a muffled explosion and immediately applied left rudder. With one engine losing oil pressure, the airplane returned to land at Changi, Singapore. The NTSB is participating in the investigation that is being led by the Air Accident Investigation Bureau of Singapore.

On April 10, 2010, an ACT Cargo Airbus A300B4 experienced an engine failure while accelerating for takeoff at Manama, Bahrain. The crew declared an emergency, rejected the takeoff, activated the fire suppression system, and evacuated the airplane. The NTSB is participating in the investigation that is being led by the Bahrain Ministry of Transportation – Civil Aviation.
The four recommendations to the FAA are as follows:
1. Immediately require operators of CF6-45/50-powered airplanes to perform high pressure turbine rotor blade borescope inspections every 15 flight cycles until the low pressure turbine stage 3 disk is replaced with a redesigned disk that can withstand the unbalance vibration forces from the high pressure rotor. (Urgent)

2. Require operators of CF6-45/50-powered airplanes to perform fluorescent penetrant inspections of CF6-45- 50- low pressure turbine stage 3 disks at every engine shop visit until the low pressure turbine stage 3 disk is replaced with a redesigned disk that can withstand the unbalance vibration forces from the high pressure rotor.

3. Immediately require General Electric Company to redesign the CF6-45/50 low pressure turbine stage 3 disk so that it will not fail when exposed to high pressure rotor unbalance forces. (Urgent)

4. Once General Electric Company has redesigned the CF6- 45/50 low pressure turbine (LPT) stage 3 disk in accordance with Safety Recommendation [3], require all operators of CF6-45/50-powered airplanes to install the newly designed LPT S3 at the next maintenance opportunity.

In the wake of the serious accident involving an Air India Express Boeing 737 at Mangalore, the Civil Aviation Minister decided to establish the Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Council (CASAC).

The Council will work directly with the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and recommend steps for improving air safety.

The proposed Council will constitute of pilots, air traffic controllers, airport operators, the air force and medical specialists. Also representatives from manufactures like Boeing, Airbus and Bombardier will be special invitees to the Council.

In its continuing investigation of a fire aboard a Boeing 757 that diverted to Dulles Airport (IAD) enroute to the Los Angeles International airport (LAX) from New York’s John F. Kennedy International airport (JFK), the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has developed the following factual information.

On Sunday, May 16, 2010, about 21:17 the pilots on United Airlines flight 27, a Boeing 757-222, N510UA, noted a strong acrid smell and observed smoke from the Captain’s lower front windshield.  The incident occurred about 30 minutes into the flight while the aircraft was level at 36,000 feet MSL.   On board the aircraft were 7 crew members and 105 passengers.

The Captain and First Officer reported that they donned their oxygen masks and smoke goggles immediately after observing the smoke and fire. The Captain then gave control of the airplane to the First Officer and discharged a halon fire extinguisher. The smoke and fire dissipated but then re-ignited. The Captain obtained a second bottle from the Purser.  The fire remained extinguished after this second bottle was discharged. At approximately 500 feet MSL on final approach to Runway19L at IAD, the Captain’s windshield cracked. The landing was uneventful. The airplane cleared the runway, after which ARFF (Aircraft Rescue Firefighting) entered the aircraft to check for residual heat and fire. None was found and the airplane was towed to the gate for deplaning. There were no evacuation and no injuries to the flight crew or passengers.

Preliminary examination of the cockpit area revealed that the inner pane of the Captain’s windshield had cracked. One of the five terminal blocks attached to the inside of the lower left windshield was consumed by fire and the portion of the wire harness associated with this terminal block was significantly damaged by fire. There was significant sooting and paint peeling to the left hand side of the windshield air frame support.

The Captain’s windshield was moved and will be examined by Board investigators at the manufacturer.

Two previous windshield fire events on B757-200 aircraft prompted the NTSB to issue Safety Recommendation A-07-50 http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2007/A07_49_50.pdf.  The Safety Board investigators will look closely at the recovered hardware to determine if this latest event is related.

Aerial view of the accident site at Darwin Airport. Photo: ATSB

A preliminary report released today by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) indicates that the fatal crash of an EMB-120 Brasilia at Darwin occurred during a simulated engine failure.

On 22 March 2010 an Embraer 120ER Brasilia turboprop plane, registered VH-ANB, was destroyed in a takeoff accident at Darwin Airport, NT (DRW), Australia. Both pilots were killed.
The ATSB report states that flight was a training flight to revalidate the captain’s command instrument rating. The supervisory pilot/training captain advised the aerodrome controller that the departure would incorporate asymmetric flight (a simulated engine failure), and was approved by the controller to perform the manoeuvre.
Witnesses reported that the takeoff appeared ‘normal’ until a few moments after becoming airborne, when the aircraft rolled and diverged left from its take-off path. They watched as the aircraft continued rolling left, and entered a steep nose-down attitude. The airplane impacted the ground in a right wing-low, nose-down attitude of about 65 degrees. A high intensity, fuel-fed fire that followed the collision with the ground destroyed most of the fuselage and cabin and right wing.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has proposed a $1.55 million civil penalty against Federal Express for allegedly failing to revise its Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program in accordance with FAA regulations.

Federal Express allegedly failed to ensure that the air carrier used approved standards, inspections, and time limitations for 14 cargo Unit Load Devices (ULDs) used on the company’s airplanes beginning in early 2008. The civil penalty addresses 124 flights from March 20 to April 17, 2008. Aircraft ULDs are sophisticated containers with integral pallets that are used to load freight.

During a routine surveillance from March 14-20, 2008, FAA inspectors determined that Federal Express had failed to incorporate Technical Standard Orders (TSOs) into its Continued Airworthiness Maintenance Program for 14 cargo ULDs. The TSOs contain specific maintenance instructions for the ULD smoke detector, power distribution feed, and batteries. Federal Express could not ensure that it used approved maintenance standards for the 14 newly installed ULDs because the company failed to make the necessary revisions to its program for overhauling and inspecting the devices.

On March 20, 2008, Federal Express was notified of the problem by the FAA but did not make the necessary revisions to its Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program until April 17, 2008.

Federal Express has 30 days from the receipt of the FAA’s civil penalty letter to respond to the agency.